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SOME REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL DISCOVERY
Andreas F. LOWENFELD *
"No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the
territorial frontier of the United States," according to the new Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, "has given rise to so much friction as the request for
documents associated with investigation and litigation in the United States"
[1]. While the rules and guidelines proposed in the Restatement for this and
other aspects of transnational activity have engendered continuing con-
troversy, no one seems to have quarreled with the quoted statement. Why
should this be so?
A complete exploration of the subject of fact-gathering in the United States
(U.S.) and other countries would require at least a small book, and also a
knowledge of procedural systems around the world that, I suspect, no single
individual possesses.
Without any presense at completeness, therefore, I want to suggest in this
brief article some of the reasons for the sharp controversy that prevails on this
subject, and to put forward some ideas that might reduce the intensity, if not
the frequency, of the conflicts.
1. Perceptions
The rest of the world - notably the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Western
Europe, but also other states that have encountered the problem - thinks U.S.
lawyers, agencies, and prosecutors, start lawsuits or investigations on minimal
bases, and rely on their adversaries or targets to build their cases for them [2].
Everyone likes to talk about fishing. In discussing the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, then less than a decade old, the U.S. Supreme Court an-
nounced in 1947 that "[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing
expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying
his opponent's case" [3]. In fact, in the case in which that statement occurred,
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the Court denied a discovery request made by a plaintiff to see the records of
conversations by the defendant's lawyer with witnesses to an accident.
But the English courts have raised precisely that cry. For instance, in Radio
Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp. [4], an American company, RCA, had
brought a patent infringement action in federal court in Chicago, and the
defendants, Rauland and Zenith, two other American corporations, defended
and counterclaimed on the basis of an allegation that RCA had engaged in an
unlawful patent-pooling and cross-licensing arrangement with numerous other
companies, including the British concerns English Electric and E.M.E. The
defendants obtained from the U.S. district judge a letter rogatory requesting
that the English court require English Electric and E.M.I., as well as certain of
their officers, to appear before a U.S. consul to "produce such documentary
evidence as is in [their] custody or possession ... and is relevant and material
to the issues pending in the [Chicago] suit," and also to answer oral interroga-
tories propounded to them. The High Court judge in London granted part of
the request. On appeal, it was turned down in its entirety. Lord Chief Justice
Goddard, summarizing a longer opinion, wrote:
this is merely an attempt to get evidence in the course of discovery proceedings
which are known to the American courts ... [as] a sort of pre-trial before the main
trial. It is an endeavour to get in evidence by examining people who may be able to
put the parties in the way of getting evidence. That is mainly what we should call a
"fishing" proceeding which is never allowed in the English courts [5].
Americans, on the other hand, have sometimes tended to think of the rest
of the world as engaged in a massive conspiracy of concealment masquerading
as privacy, blocking others designed to protect wrongdoing, and secrecy laws
intended to draw corporate and sovereign veils over all kinds of evil, from
drug dealing to tax evasion to commercial fraud to manufacture of defective
products.
No doubt there is some basis for both of these perceptions. American
lawyers, both in private actions and in governmental investigations, are
sometimes grasping, often lazy, and think nothing is wrong with a discovery
request that begins "All memoranda, documents, or other records ... " [6].
That discovery is overused, misused, and abused in the U.S. has become
almost a clich among American observers of the domestic litigation process,
though there is disagreement about both the extent of the problem and the
cure [7]. It is also true that blocking and secrecy laws, and exaggerated respect
for separate incorporation among members of a commonly controlled eco-
nomic enterprise, are used to prevent disclosure of facts that ought to be
disclosed, and sometimes lead to miscarriage of justice. Companies owned and
controlled from the U.K. but located in South Africa or Mozambique supplied
oil to Rhodesia contrary to British and United Nations sanctions, though this
was not permitted to be brought out in an English court [8]. Societ6 Interna-
tionale (or I.G. Chemie, or Interhandel) was in fact a respository of assets of
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I.G. Farben, the engine that drove Hitler's war machine, though the docu-
ments that would have confirmed that link were covered by Swiss banking
secrecy [9]. But not all American discovery is abusive, and the idea that
American lawyers use discovery to fabricate a cause of action that they were
not sure even existed is vastly overdrawn. Correspondingly, while some foreign
confidentiality laws are designed, or used, to cloak crime or fraud, that cannot
be said of the great majority of transactions carried out under such regimes,
and certainly not of the techniques of fact-gathering used in continental legal
systems. Each side - the American, the British, and the continental - views
the others in comparison with its own system and finds it in some way
objectionable. My impression, however, is that the adverse perceptions greatly
outrun the justified objections; litigation proceeds in foreign developed coun-
tries on the basis of a body of relevant fact roughly comparable to that on
which litigation proceeds in the U.S. Of course, some actions now almost
commonplace in the U.S. - class actions, product liability suits, private (treble
damage) antitrust actions, to name just a few - are either unknown or very
rare abroad. Also, litigation invoking transnational discovery tends to involve
other sources of tension, such as the reach of judicial and prescriptive
jurisdiction of the forum state. Often objections to the cause of action, private
or governmental, take the form of objection to discovery, when something else
is really at stake.
The first lesson, I submit, is a lesson of disaggregation. Both sides, or rather
all sides, should separate concerns about disclosure/concealment from dif-
ferences about other aspects of procedure - contingent fees, for example, or
juries - as well as about substance [10].
The second lesson relates more directly to the perceptions - and mispercep-
tions - that each side has of the other's fact-gathering or fact-suppression
techniques. Foreign-based litigants in the U.S. and their governmental spon-
sors should look at requests or orders for discovery not from the point of view
of "what is next if this request is complied with?" - an attitude that will
inevitably reflect inaccurate generalized perceptions - but rather from the
point of view of the justification of the particular request or order. Corre-
spondingly, American litigants or investigators should frame their requests in
light of these perceptions, and endeavor to demonstrate that the particular
request does not confirm, but rather is distinguishable from the American
reputation in this area of arrogance and overreaching.
2. Some Facts
It is difficult - especially for an academic who has not served in the
trenches - to satisfy the need. If I know more about English and continental
practice than most American lawyers, and more about American practice than
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
A. Lowenfeld / Transnational Discovery
most English and continental lawyers, I still do not have enough of a feel for
how any of the systems functions with respect to discovery to write with
confidence about them. Does the American system, for example, really encour-
age settlements, or does it more often turn a lawsuit into a financial endurance
contest? Does the English practice preserve too much of the sporting element
and the Oxford/Cambridge oral tradition, or is it a rational system for
preparing the real contest before the judge [11]? Has the European system
wisely separated the investigation of facts from the adversary process of legal
argument or has it turned litigation over to tired bureaucrats? Does any of the
systems come closer to the search for truth - or should one say justice - than
the others? Just in stating the questions in this way suggests that to some
extent there is dissatisfaction, but also self-satisfaction, with each of these
systems.
It may seem odd to have divided this discussion of discovery into three,
rather than two, systems. But if the civil law countries of the West have
roughly comparable systems of fact-gathering, the common law countries in
this respect have moved in quite different directions. At the most general level,
all the states of the common law world are in one camp, those of the civil law
world in the other. In the American, as in the English system, discovery takes
place between completion of pleadings and commencement of the trial, and is
conducted essentially by the lawyers. In the continental system, in contrast,
there is no real trial in civil cases, and hence no division between trial and
pre-trial.
2.1. Civil Law Countries
In the civil law system, the judge is literally in charge of finding the facts.
He reads the documents supplied by counsel, sends for any public records that
seem relevant to the contentions of the parties and keeps the dossier. He can
require the parties to produce documents at his own initiative or at the parties'
suggestion [12]. If he chooses to hear testimony, he summons the witness and
conducts an oral examination. Counsel are entitled to be present, and to
suggest questions or ask questions directly after the judge has completed his
examination [13]. When the witness has finished - or at intervals if the
testimony is lengthy - the judge will dictate a summary of the testimony,
which becomes another document in the dossier. Thereafter, counsel may
suggest further lines of inquiry, including further document production or
testimony from additional witnesses, but it is the judge who is in charge, and if
he regards a document or testimony as not necessary or relevant, the docu-
ment will not be requested or the witness not called. This progression may, in
a complicated case, take place several times before the dossier is closed. The
adversary process is preserved in legal argument, which, depending on the
country or the court in question, may be before the same judge, before a panel
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that includes him, or before a different panel or judge. Discovery, European-
style, however, is a judicial function, not just in the sense of an exercise of
sovereignty, as it sometimes seems in America, but in an everyday operational
sense. It is also relevant, I think, that in most European counties, in contrast
to the Anglo-Saxon world, the judge is likely never to have practiced law, but
to have opted for a judicial career soon after finishing his or her university
studies. Thus, the European judge is rather like an umpire in American
professional baseball, who works his way up from the minor to the major
leagues, but typically has not been a professional player or manager [14].
Z2. England
On this level, as already noted, the continental system stands on one side,
the common law system on the other. Looking just a bit further at the English
system it is apparent that it differs substantially from the practice under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as most state systems, in the U.S.
Under the English practice [15], discovery is almost entirely limited to docu-
ments in the control of the parties. Within fourteen days after the close of
pleadings, each side's solicitor prepares and sends to his adversary a list of
documents which are or have been in his client's possession relating to the
matters in dispute[16]. Thereafter, each party is entitled to inspect the docu-
ments on the list of the other, and to make copies of any non-privileged
documents which it did not already have. Lawyers are duty and honor bound
to see that this process is faithfully carried out, and that their client does not
withhold documents that should be disclosed. If one party believes the other
has not made complete discovery, he may request an order from the court
requiring the other party to give an affidavit that it has disclosed all relevant
documents; also, he may apply to the court for an order directing the other
party to produce a particular document that the applicant believes or suspects
is in the other party's possession. In some instances, documents may be made
available for inspection subject to an order precluding disclosure to third
parties. A document not disclosed in discovery may not later be introduced
into evidence by the party that should have disclosed it, and failure to make
disclosure may give rise to sanctions, including striking of a claim or defense
and contempt (committal) [17].
If the scope of discovery of documents is not as wide in England as it is in
the U.S., because it must be relevant not just calculated to lead to admissible
evidence [18], it does appear that as between parties both sides are likely to
have the same documents at their disposal in preparing for trial. But there is
no pre-trial discovery of third parties, and there is no examination before trial,
apart from preservation by deposition of the testimony of aged or ill persons
or those about to leave the realm. Discovery is generally not available against
non-parties [19], though they may be summoned as witnesses at the trial, and
423
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may be required to bring specified documents with them. But except for expert
witnesses to be called by a party, the substance of whose testimony may be
required to be disclosed in advance [20], counsel will learn for the first time at
the trial what the witnesses called by the other side have to say [21].
2.3. United States
Just to complete this inevitably superficial survey, consider how one should
explain American-style discovery to non-Americans [22]. First, as in England,
discovery takes place following completion of pleadings and is supposed to be
completed before the case is set down for trial. Also, as in England, discovery
is supposed to be done by lawyers, without intervention by the judge, though
this is changing as the rule makers seek to curb various perceived excesses in
discovery practice [23]. Counsel have a wide array of devices at their disposal,
including discovery of documents and inspection of properly written interro-
gatories, requests for admission, and depositions of parties and non-party
witnesses [24]. Though the federal rule on document discovery is by its terms
limited to parties, non-parties can be summoned for deposition, and by use of
a subpoena duces tecum they can generally be required to produce documents
for inspection and copying.
A deposition, often referred to as an examination before trial or EBT, is
typically a kind of dress rehearsal for a courtroom appearance. The witness
appears accompanied by his counsel or, if he is a non-party, accompanied by
counsel of the party that did not call him, and is examined under oath by
counsel for the other party, with a shorthand reporter recording all questions
and answers. This is followed by "cross-examination," "re-direct," and "re-
cross," until no more remains to be said. Only the judge is absent. Objections
to questions are noted, and either the witness answers subject to the objection,
of if he is directed not to answer by his counsel, the question remains without
answer. Generally, the deposition cannot be introduced directly into evidence
at trial, but it gives both sides an idea of the witness' knowledge and attitude,
and of course any discrepancies between the deposition and testimony in court
can be brought out at the trial [25].
Though there are some limits to discovery, for example, the attorney-client
privilege, and though the court can step in and impose additional limits when
it thinks discovery has gone on too long or become unnecessarily cumulative
or unduly burdensome [26], the basic thrust is expansive. Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that parties may obtain discovery
regarding "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action." Discovery is not limited to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery, but may extend as well to the claim or
defense of any other party. Moreover, and in sharp contrast to the English
practice, discovery may extend to the existence (or not) of any documents,
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even if the party requesting disclosure does not know what is it looking for,
and to "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter." Rule 26 says expressly that "[i]t is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."
The operational rule in discovery, as James and Hazard put it, is that
anything is discoverable "unless its disclosure is prohibited by specific limita-
tions on scope" [27]. Failure to comply with discovery requests of opposing
counsel may lead to court orders to comply, and failure to obey those orders
subjects the recalcitrant party to a wide array of sanctions, including striking
of claims or defenses, findings adverse to the non-complying party, and
contempt of court [28].
' By the time a case comes to trial - if it does so at all - the effect of
discovery is that each side knows quite well what the other side will say,
though of course it is not sure what will impress the court or jury. Many issues
of fact will disappear because the evidence is all one way. Often - and this is
one of the claimed advantages - pre-trial discovery leads to a settlement that
would not have been possible without discovery. The presentation of evidence
at trial may well be smoother, because each side has heard it before. Also, the
effect of delay between the events giving rise to the action and the trial is to
some extent reduced, because witnesses (including in American parlance the
parties) have their own prior depositions to refresh their recollections. On the
other hand, discovery American-style itself delays the time between joinder of
issue and trial, and it unquestionably increases the costs of litigation, some-
times massively so. When the parties are unevenly matched economically, this
is an advantage for the party with the deeper pocket. To some extent, however,
this advantage, which typically inures to large corporations, insurance compa-
nies, and governmental agencies, is compensated for by the system of contin-
gent fees, whereby the costs of discovery - disbursements and legal fees - are
absorbed by counsel in anticipation of sharing in the ultimate judgment.
Perhaps the most problematic feature of the American system of discovery,
especially as seen from abroad but also as understood by American observers
[29], is that it changes the legal position of the parties: claims that could not
successfully be brought because they could not be proven became possible.
This is most notable in medical malpractice and product liability cases, but
may also be important in commercial fraud. and antitrust actions. Sometimes
this effect works for defendants, for instance in discovering that plaintiff
suffered from an illness or injury incurred before the act alleged to have
caused the harm complained of; on balance, however, discovery, American-
style, seems to favor plaintiffs, litigation in general, and those - the United
States seems to have more of them than any other country - who seek to use
litigation to upset the applecart.
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To round out the picture, it should be said that the model of discovery in
private civil litigation is used by investigative and enforcement agents of
government as well - especially in regard to documents. Investigations may be
launched even before a lawsuit is brought, and requests can go out for
production of documents, often in very sweeping, undefined form [30]. So, too,
can criminal investigations, conducted nominally by grand juries, but in fact
usually run by a prosecuting attorney. Some of the most contentious transna-
tional discovery problems have arisen not through civil discovery as described
above, but through government initiatives in civil or criminal proceedings [31].
Of course it is also true that the targets of such discovery requests have the
strongest incentives to resist disclosure, not only of their own files but of
records of those whom they have dealt with, such as banks and brokerage
houses. These subjects are not discussed further here, but they form a
background to disputes regarding civil discovery: if the problems here addre-
ssed can be resolved, these problems would be next on the agenda [32].
3. Some Suggestions
Does any of these systems produce justice in greater measure than the
others? Professor Langbein, an American-based comparatist, wrote recently of
the German advantage in civil procedure [33], by which he meant primarily the
German (and by inference, similar European) techniques for assembling the
facts pertinent to legal disputes. But he is clearly in a minority. While there are
movements everywhere for reform at the margin [34] - probably most active in
the United States - the legal profession in each system thinks of its procedures
as the norm, and the other systems, whether or not it understands them, as
somehow unfortunate.
No one, however, has a right to assume that the system he is accustomed to
will prevail in all respects in litigation touching on more than one country or
legal system. This is such a truism that one is almost embarrased to put it in
print. The whole subject of conflict of laws since the founding of the subject in
the late Middle Ages has been concerned with the way one state's legal system
copes with events that took place or had effect in another state [35]. But where
conflict of laws has been weakest - one may almost say non-existent if one
excludes the neighboring subject of jurisdiction and judgments - is the subject
of procedure.
It used to be said that substantive law is governed according to the
applicable rules of choice of law, but that procedure is governed by the law of
the forum [36]. But clearly such a statement was too simple - an issue might
be "substantive" for some purposes, "procedural" for others [37]. Statutes of
frauds, periods of limitations, burdens of proof on such issues as contributory
fault and standing to sue were typical examples of issues that were in some
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sense adjective, as contrasted with substantive law, yet were not ineluctably
excluded from the choice of law process. We soon learned to grope for rules or
approaches to these subjects, not always with perfect success [38], but at least
with the understanding that these issues were different from such subjects as
whether motions are heard on Tuesdays or Fridays, whether one judge handles
all phases of a case, whether a jury consists of six or twelve persons (or indeed
whether a jury is available at all), which side makes its closing arguments first,
whether related counterclaims must be raised or may be saved for a later day,
and whether interlocutory appeals are permitted. Without, it seems, thinking
about the question, we have placed the means of procuring evidence in this
second category, the category to which the techniques and values of conflict of
laws are not generally relevant.
When the other jurisdiction involved - i.e., the state where a witness
resides, documents are kept, or a factory is located - was one with a similar
system of discovery, this created relatively little difficulty. New York and
Pennsylvania, Bavaria and North Rhine Westphalia, England and Ireland are
sufficiently similar that choice of law is not an issue. As transactions and
litigation have become more and more internationalized, it is clear that the
problem is a real one. My contention is that at least in the first instance the
problem is not one of jurisdiction, nor of sovereignty, but of choice of law.
Having made this point, to be sure, is far from solving the problem. Choice
of law in the last quarter of the twentieth century rarely yields precise,
uniformly accepted answers. But choice of law invites thinking about the
considerations of forum versus locus law in terms of interests, expectations,
and fairness, in a way that the debate over transnational discovery has not
often seen. There is one big proviso, however. Choice of law holds promise in
this context only if each forum regards the law of the other as merely different,
not fundamentally unacceptable. To take an easy example, if examinations of
witnesses in France or Germany are recorded through summaries by the judge
or a court official [391, whereas in the United States and England they are
transcribed verbatim [40], it requires no great leap of faith or swallowing of
pride for the United States to permit a witness to be examined in New York or
Chicago by a German judge or his delegate, who will make a summary of the
testimony, subject to the witness' approval, for use in a German lawsuit [41];
nor is it difficult for a German judge or official to accept that a deposition
given in Germany for use in an American proceeding be taken down word-
for-word in shorthand.
I have, of course, chosen the easiest example, skipping over momentarily
the more difficult questions - may the witness be examined at all? may he be
compelled to testify? what questions may he be required to answer? what
documents can he be ordered to produce? what privileges can he invoke. My
point thus far has been only to illustrate that so long as issues of procedure are
regarded as matters of taste and not of fundamental faith, choice of law shows
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promise. A rule that says "the forum where the testimony is to be used
determines the manner in which the testimony will be recorded" is a sensible
and unobjectionable rule. A different rule, to the effect that "the manner of
recording an oral deposition is governed by the way such a deposition would
be recorded if it were to be used in the jurisdiction where it is given," would
also be possible, but it would make less sense, and would call for a second rule
at each forum concerning the admissibility of testimony thus recorded [42].
The first rule is clearly simpler and more persuasive. It focuses on the needs
and interests of the place of litigation, and reflects the absence of any
countervailing interest of the other state that might be impaired by following
the lexfori. But note that the proposed rule has not asked what the underlying
action was about, what law was applicable to the transaction, or even what law
had the most significant connection with the activity about which the witness
was being interrogated. None of these factors would be useful in answering
our very simple first question: how should a deposition be recorded?
Consider a more difficult issue: suppose, whether through letter rogatory or
otherwise, a non-party witness is examined in country B in connection with a
lawsuit in country A. A question is put to him that he would rather not
answer. The proponent of the question says it is a perfectly appropriate
question under the law of A, and whether the question or the answer would be
admissible under the law of B is without significance. The witness says "I am
in B, and B's rules relating to interrogation of witnesses should govern." Who
is right?
In the first instance, of course, if B's compulsory process is invoked, a
judge in B will have to decide. But should he really say what the High Court
judge in Rauland said in reviewing the order of a Master directing the
witnesses to answer the questions put in the letter rogatory issued by a U.S.
court? "The enforcement of such an order against any company or person not
a party to the action would, I think, be grossly oppressive when judged by the
standards of our own civil procedure, and I do not propose to judge it by any
other standard (emphasis added)" [43].
At some level, the italized phrase is correct; country B should not, for the
sake of a lawsuit in A, give up its privilege against self-incrimination, and I am
prepared to say that if the witness has such a privilege under the law of either
A or B, it should be available [44]. Devotion to the privilege against self-in-
crimination is powerful enough so that it probably trumps choice of law
analysis. But a rule in B (contrary to the rule in A) that non-party witnesses
cannot be examined before trial is not, I submit, of equal force; nor is a rule in
country C that the judges do the examining while in country A counsel do it;
nor a rule in country D that a document might be inadmissible at trial and
therefore not disclosable, while in A it would be admissible or would be
disclosable even if not ultimately admissible. It seems to me that each of these
examples is more analogous to our easiest illustration, covering recording of
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the preceeding, than to the example concerning the privilege against self
incrimination. If I am right about that, the court in B, C, or D should ask itself
"what interest of this country would be impaired by granting the request,"
and not (to paraphrase Professor Higgins in My Fair Lady) "why can't A be
like us?"
As for the question of "fishing expeditions," there may be more involved
than a question of taste; I have difficulty, however, in finding any high moral
principle in the debate, as contrasted with expressions of the exaggerated
perceptions outlined in Part 1 of this article. Not seldom, I suspect, the game
is rather one of "hide and seek." A recent decision of the House of Lords, In
re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases [45], may serve as an illustration. The
facts are complicated, but the stakes were high.
Four major American manufacturers of asbestos, including the Johns-Man-
ville Corporation, were (and are) defendants in numerous class as well as
individual tort actions by people who had worked in asbestos plants, alleging
harm from ingestion of asbestos fibers for which the manufacturers should be
held responsible. The manufacturers, in turn, brought suit in Superior Court in
San Francisco against a number of insurance companies as well as several
underwriting syndicates at Lloyd's of London [46]. Simplifying a complex set
of facts somewhat, the manufacturers sought a declaration that the insurers
and underwriters (a) were required to defend the actions brought on behalf of
the workers; and (b) were required to indemnify the manufacturers against
any liability that might be found. The issuers and underwriters (1) denied that
certain alleged coverages, dating back to 1920, existed at all; (2) disputed the
extent of coverage - i.e., contended either that the policies only covered claims
brought in the period of the policy, or that the policies in force throughout the
period of exposure to asbestos should cover the manufacturers' liability in
proportion to the time that any given policy was in force; (3) disputed the
construction of the policies, in particular as to the level when so-called
"excess" liability attached; and (4) alleged that the manufacturers had not
adequately disclosed to the insurers and underwriters their knowledge of the
hazards of asbestos. The amounts involved, as is well known, are staggering
[47].
Many of the policies in question, it turned out, had been placed (skipping
intermediaries) through a London brokerage firm, Sedgwick. Now the Super-
ior Court in San Francisco, through a letter of request issued pursuant to the
Hague Evidence Convention [48], requested the testimony of certain persons
employed by or associated with Sedgwick, and the production of various
documents from Sedgwick's files.
The individual witnesses sought relief from any duty to give testimony;
Sedgwick did not contest the request for the policies themselves, but resisted
all the requests that related to written instructions by the insured to the
brokers and to the applications for the policies. The policies were identified by
numbers and dates of issue.
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The High Court judge who first heard the matter sustained the letter of
request with respect both to oral testimony and, for the most part, to
production of the documents requested; the Court of Appeal (2-1) affirmed
with respect to testimony and most of the documents. The House of Lords
affirmed as to testimony of the individuals, but rejected all the contested
document requests. Citing Rauland and Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. V. Westinghouse
Electric Corp. [49], the House of Lords said that the Evidence (Procedure in
other jurisdictions) Act of 1975, which had been enacted in preparation for
adherence by the U.K. to the Hague Evidence Convention, speaks of particu-
lar documents, not classes of documents, and that these must be actual
documents, i.e., the proponent must know that the documents exist. The
requests here failed on both counts. "[For all that appears," Lord Fraser
wrote, "it is possible that instruction for some policies may have been given
verbally and that there were no written instructions for those policies."
Thus, the request, "in effect calls for production of 'written instructions if
any'," and that was not good enough to meet the test of actuality. It follows
that the request then must be considered as one for "all or any documents
falling within the class consisting of written instructions," but such a request
would fail the test of particularity [50].
Would the requests have been approved if the American attorneys who
drafted the letter of request had been more precise, and had asked for
"written instructions, or notes of oral instructions from the insured to Sedg-
wick"? Since one supposes that insurance brokers arranging cover either deal
in written instructions or make notes of telephone instructions, such a request
ought to cover all the policies in question, and thus meet the actuality test; it
seems doubtful, however, that even such an amended request would meet the
particularity test. Lord Fraser explained, borrowing from the dissent in the
Court of Appeal:
[Ain order for production of the respondents' "monthly bank statements for the
year 1984 relating to his current account" with a named bank would satisfy the
requirements of [the Evidence Act of 1975], provided that the evidence showed that
regular monthly statements had been sent to the respondent during the year and
were likely to be still in his possession. But a general request for "all the
respondents' bank statements for 1984" would ... refer to a class of documents and
would not be admissible [51].
With all respect, I do not understand the distinction, at least if the second
example also names a bank; even if it does not but it is clear that the request
relates, say, to London bank accounts, the distinction being drawn is a very
thin membrane indeed, hardly a great wall between unjustified snooping and
reasonable trial preparation or fact-finding. Coming back to the Asbestos
Insurance cases, it is difficult to see how English interests (as contrasted with
the interests of the underwriters) would be harmed by ordering the evidence
disclosed [52]. Why should the English courts, as F-2, not say in respect to
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documents, what the House of Lords said in upholding the requests to take the
oral testimony of the named witnesses:
[Tihe court of request should not be astute to examine the issues in the action and
the circumstances of the case with excessive particularity for the purpose of
determining in advance whether the evidence of that person will be relevant and
admissible. This is essentially matter for the requesting court [531.
Could one not make this statement the basis of a general principle of choice of
law applicable to transnational fact-gathering for purposes of litigation?
Without diverting too much energy at this point into the drafting of a
precise rule, the principle might be formulated something like this:
Reasonable requests for disclosure of information for use in a civil action pending
in another state may be carried out, and if necessary, supported by order of the
court or other authority of the state where the witness of information is located, in
accordance with the law of the state where the action is pending. [54]
I do not, as noted, want at this preliminary stage to dwell too long on details
of drafting. If this were a statute or treaty, there would need to be more
explanations, definitions, and possibly some exceptions.
The question of the right not to give evidence - "privilege" in American
and English lawyers' parlance - is particularly troublesome. However, I am
here proposing only a principle. But note that the principle does not depend
on an international agreement. Further note that it does not distinguish
between documents and testimony, between information requested from par-
ties and non-parties; or between requests made directly from one party to
another, as under several provisions of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure [55], or requests pursuant to court order, as under Rule 37(a) of the
U.S. Federal Rules, or Sections 524 and 429 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure (ZPO), Article 11 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure, or
Order 39 of the English Rules of the Supreme Court [56]. Thus, the principle
does not depend on a system of state-to-state commitments to judicial assis-
tance, though it could easily accommodate such a system, and as we shall see
in the final part of this essay, might make such a system function much more
effectively than at present.
The key to the principle, of course, is the word "reasonable," a word that
some lawyers and legislators fear, but that the drafters of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, for instance, found quite useful [57]. My feeling is that a consensus
around the concept of reasonableness in this narrow area of the law should be
possible to construct. If that it true, then the Hague Evidence Convention,
which is supposed to address this subject, can be saved, and indeed be made
into a useful channel and symbol of international cooperation. If not, the
Convention will fade into irrelevance, and transnational discovery will turn
ever more into a power contest - threats of sanctions on one side, increased
use of blocking statutes and exorbitant privileges on the other - and litigation
conducted on less than the best information.
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4. The Hague Evidence Convention
What then of the Hague Evidence Convention? It presently has seventeen
state parties, including many (though not all) of the major industrial states of
the West, and a number of other states are considering becoming parties. The
basic techniques of the Convention are sound. Each state party designates a
Central Authority to receive Letters of Request for judicial assistance from
courts in other state parties. If litigation is pending in state A for which
information located in state B is desired, the court in A sends its request, in a
standard form, to the Central Authority in B, and the Authority, usually the
Ministry of Justice or comparable organ, forwards the request to the ap-
propriate court. That court summons the witness (or custodian of documents)
for examination, if necessary through compulsory process. The record of the
examination and any documents furnished, or an explanation why the witness"
could not be examined or the documents produced, are then sent through B's
Central Authority to the court in A, where they may be used or not according
to the laws of A. To the extent state B regard the taking of evidence as a
judifical function, the requirement is met by the engagement of the court in
both A and B.
So far, so good. The creation of channels of communication, a standard
form, and some rules about authentication and translation are useful improve-
ments over prior, often improvised practices of judicial assistance [58]. But has
the Convention worked as it was supposed to, as a bridge between the
common and civil systems [59]?
I think it must be said that the answer is no, at least as far as the United
States is concerned. One signal that this is so is the astonishing amount of
litigation in the United States concerning the question of whether resort to the
Convention is (1) required, or (2) even if not, whether "considerations of
comity" normally call for resort to the Convention before an order can be
given to a party for testimony of witnesses or production of documents
situated abroad [60].
Whatever the outcome of this controversy, pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court as these lines are written, it is clear that those resisting discovery -
typically defendants [61] - regard the Convention as a shield, and those who
seek discovery - typically plaintiffs - usually give up the effort when told to
resort to the Convention [62]. That certainly is not the way the Convention
was advertised.
When I first looked at the Hague Evidence Convention, I thought that
while mandatory use of the Convention could not be derived from the text,
resort to the Convention as a matter of judicial discretion and preference with
respect to discovery orders for information located abroad was persuasive [63].
If there was an international agreement for cooperation among states, why not
use it; if there were issues of law - for instance whether a given privilege under
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the law of B was applicable - having the courts of B pass on the claim of
privilege made sense. And if resort of the Convention by American lawyers
meant that the judge where the litigation was pending would need to approve
- and presumably screen - discovery requests directed abroad, so much the
better [64]. On further study, however, I am disappointed by the Convention,
for two principal reasons.
First, because Article 23, drafted by the British and eagerly embraced by
nearly all the other state parties (except for the United States), gave - not
preserved but bestowed - the right to member states to declare that they
would not execute Letters of Request issued "for the purpose of obtaining
pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." The
majority of states made blanket declarations under Article 23. and thus, made
mandatory document production through the Convention virtually impossible
for use in American litigation [65], since as perhaps the Europeans had not
understood, but the British surely must have, by the time the pre-trial stage is
finished and the trial starts, the opportunity for discovery in the sense of
eliciting documents or testimony is over. All requests for documents originat-
ing from American courts, in order words, are by definition "pre-trial dis-
covery;" thus, one can expect more cases such as the Corning Glass Works v.
International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. [66] case in Germany, in which
the third party witnesses were required to testify against their will, but could
not be made to produce documents. Mr. X could be asked, "Were you at a
meeting in Paris on September 15 with representatives of the plaintiff?"
Answer: Yes. "Did you make a memorandum of what occurred at the
meeting?" Answer: Yes. "May we see the memorandum?" Objection sustained
[67]. That, I submit, makes little sense in a patent/antitrust case [68]. In
product liability litigation, which has been the occasion of most of the
controversy concerning discovery and the Hague Evidence Convention, and
where what is sought are designs, engineering data, test results, and the like, it
makes the Convention useless. To be sure a number of states, following the
United Kingdom, have modified their original declarations to limit their
refusals to execute document requests under the Convention to requests that
require a person (a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings are or
have been in his possession; and (b) to produce any documents other than
particular documents specified in the Letter of Request [69]. We saw what that
meant in the Asbestos Insurance cases - some improvement, but a good deal
less than receptivity to even a fairly well-focused discovery request 170]. At
least as regards the states that have maintained their original blanket refusals
to execute American document request under Article 23, including France and
Germany, "considerations of comity" (to use an expression I do not like but
which is often used in this connection) do not, I submit, call for deference.
when the court has jurisdiction over a party and it has in its power the
possibility of bringing the documents and employees/witnesses to the United
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States for examination. If Article 23 were eliminated - or substantially revised
- I would be prepared to re-examine the question [71].
But there is a second, more subtle reason that I find the Hague Evidence
Convention disappointing. The approach of the Convention, it seems to me,
proceeds too much from the point of view of sovereignty and public interna-
tional law, not from the point of view of conflict of laws or private interna-
tional law. It is probably correct as a general principle of public international
law that no act in support of the exercise of jurisdiction by state A can be
carried out in state B without B's consent [72]; it seems to me, however, that
by now such consent should be taken for granted among like-minded states,
and not bestowed as a concession to be bargained about [73]. The Hague
Evidence Convention, in other words, is useful in bringing the measures of
compulsion of B to bear on witnesses in B for use in litigation in A (and vice
versa); it is not designed to enable B's courts or authorities to sit in judgment
on the laws and practices of A.
Article 12 of the Convention says, in pertinent part:
The execution of a Letter of Request may be refused only to the extent that
(a) in the State of execution the execution of the Letter does not full within the
functions of the judiciary;
(b) the State or addressed considers that its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced thereby 174].
Perhaps it is necessary to retain something like paragraph (b). It should be
clear, however, that the state, as contrasted with its courts, really does not
have a role to play; its organs should carry the mail, not read or judge it.
Moreover, unless someone seeks to use international judicial assistance to pry
out military secrets or internal government discussions, which seems improb-
able [75], a state should not consider that its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced by a request for discovery [76]. The fact that state B may like a
cartel in which party to a lawsuit in A is alleged to be engaged, or may be
concerned that its enterprises will get a bad name if design flaws in their
products are exposed, is not a justification to interfere with private litigation.
Article 9 of the Convention says:
The judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its own law
as to the methods and procedures to be followed.
However, it will follow a request of the requesting authority that a special method
or procedure be followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal law of the
State of execution or is impossible of performance ... [77].
This is satisfactory as far as it goes, and usually takes care of the first, and
easiest of the problems mentioned here - whether the record will be kept
verbatim or summarized, and whether counsel or the presiding judicial officer
will do the questioning. But it is not sufficient.
I would like to see an additional provision that would set forth something
like the principle proposed in Part 3 of this article:
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"As to the scope of the request, and the admissibility of any information procured
through the facilities of the Convention, the law to be applied will ordinarily be the
law of the state of origin of the request."
Would such a provision be incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention,
which in effect provides that a person may refuse to give evidence in response
to a Letter of Request in so fast as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give
evidence under the law of either State B or State A? I must confess that I have
not solved this problem, which straddles the public/private law division.
Clearly, it deserves more thought. Possibly a reader of these lines can come up
with a suggestion, either in this journal or elsewhere.
So far as the rights not to give evidence are widely accepted, such as the
attorney-client, husband-wife, and self-incrimination privileges, perhaps doc-
tor-patient and priest-penitent as well, there is no real problem: even if the
"privilege" were interpreted somewhat differently at the margin - say whether
a communication with in-house counsel or a patent agent qualifies for the
attorney-client privilege - I would be content to let B's law govern. When it
comes to additional entitlements not to testify, however, such as the Japanese
privilege not to bring disgrace on one's employer [78], or the German entitle-
ment not to give out information whose release an enterprise regards as
commercially disadvantageous [79], I am less clear. Ideally, there would be
some agreement on the relationship between the right to refuse to answer and
the duty to give evidence.
Failing that, it would seem to me at least worth exploring whether the right
to withhold evidence would not depend on the law of the place with the most
significant relationship to the transaction about which evidence is sought. If,
for example, it were alleged that X, Y, and Z arranged in state A to divide up
markets and not challenge each other's inventions, and now an official of Z,
who was at the meeting, declines in B to answer questions about the meeting,
the duty to testify versus the right not to testify might well be governed by the
law of A. The decision should be made, in the first instance, by the court in B,
but that court should consider the matter as raising a choice of law question,
and should not inevitably apply the law of B.
Could the United States - typically state A - do something to earn the
changes I have suggested? Of course, to the extent I am advocating a change in
attitude, one need not look for precise bargains or a quid pro quo. But
remember that the change of attitude in favor of a conflict of laws approach
depends on the law of A not being fundamentally unacceptable. I would hope
that more modest, more focused discovery, screened by judges sensitive to the
perceptions and additudes of others, would be a step in the right direction.
Requests for discovery reflecting genuine search and preparation by the
proponent, not just a desire to let one's adversary do the work or run up
charges, would not, after all, be un-American. Indeed, a rule focused on
transnational discovery might well serve as a testing ground for reforms in
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domestic litigation as well, even as transnational cases have served to intro-
duce and consolidate improvements in other aspects of American law on the
borderline between substance and procedure, such as the validity of choice of
forum clauses [80], arbitration of securities and antitrust issues [81], and the
relation between choice of law and forum non conveniens [82].
5. Conclusion
One need not agree with either the definition or the condemnation of
"fishing" that we saw in the English cases to conclude that sometimes
American lawyers' nets are cast too wide, or that the form reproduced at note
6 above can be considerably improved. We certainly need not wait with
reforms such as I suggest until the Hague Evidence Convention can be
renegotiated (though that may come sooner rather than later if the use of the
Convention as a shield fails in the Supreme Court).
Perceptions are probably harder to change than practice, and we can look
forward to mutual distrust in this area for quite some time. I think it is not
unreasonable, however, to look for changes along these lines: (1) more focused
and restrained discovery requests by American counsel; (2) more attentive
control of transnational discovery by courts in the United States, including, as
appropriate, opinions accompanying discovery ordered or requests, explaining
the reasons for the order or request in ways that may be weighed by courts
and parties abroad; (3) less rejection of the "modified" American way by
courts and governments of other states, with more attention to the goals of
litigation and less to governmental or sovereign interests; and (4) a restructur-
ing of the Hague Evidence Convention to a more private- and less public-law
orientation, possibly trading exclusivity or something like it for more accom-
modation, and less resistance, to uncovering the facts necessary to resolution
of legal disputes.
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My Lords, one of the characteristics of the rules of civil procedure in the federal courts of
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cause of action. Instead, the complaint is accompanied, or immediately followed, by a
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oral and written, that it makes available for a wide-roving search for any information that
might be helpful to the case of the party seeking discovery, the enormous expense,
irrecoverable in any award of costs to a successful defendant, in which it may involve
parties from whom discovery is sought, and its potentiality for oppressive use by plaintiffs.
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(a) The Defendant's total dollar volume of monthly sales for each month beginning with the
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[45] [19851 1 W.L.R. 331 (H.L.).
[46] The asbestos litigation, of course, is a major cause celebre in American legal development,
of which insurance claims are only a part, though not an insignificant part. See, e.g., Epstein,
Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law, Regulation, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 14. For a
discussion of the issues in the insurance cases, see, e.g., 3A L. Frumer and M. Friedman, Products
Liability § 50.01C (rev. ed. 1986); Comment, Liability Insurance for Insidious Disease: Who Picks
up the Tab? 48 Fordham L. Rev. 657 (1980); Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability:
Alternative to Contract Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 739 (1984); Comment, Asbestosis: Who Will Pay
the Plaintiff ?, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1491 (1983).
[47] Professor Epstein, in his 1982 article cited at supra note 46, reports that as of that time
16,500 claims had been filed against Johns-Manville alone, with 500 nev claims being brought
every month and potential liability in excess of two billion dollars. By spring 1986, the number of
claims seems to have reached 20,000. See Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos
- Carnage Cover-up, and Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (1986).
[48] Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted (with
declarations by Contracting States) in 28 U.S.C.A. following § 1781 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter
cited as Convention].
[49] 1978 A.C. 547.
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[50] Asbestos Insurance, [1985] 1 W.LR. at 338-39.
[51] Id. at 337-38.
[52] I hasten to add (1) that Lloyd's underwriters are about 50% non-U.K. residents; and (2)
that there is no evidence in these or other cases that the English courts favor English parties. If
there is "hometown justice," it takes the form expressed by the judge in Rauland, quoted at note
43, i.e., a preference for doing things "our own way."
[53] Asbestos Insurance, [1985] 1 W.L.R. at 339-40 (quoting from the speech of Lord Keith of
Kinkel in Westinghouse, 1978 A.C. at 654).
[54] Essentially, this is the rule which the U.S. applies when asked to render assistance in
connection with litigation pending in a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982); Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 474 (Tent. Draft No. 6. 1985) and
sources there cited.
(551 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (deposition), 33 (written interrogatory). 34 (production of
documents and things and inspection of premises).
[56] R.S.C.. order 39, the Eng;lish provision for examinations outside the jurisdiction, was
recently amended to include production of documents, as well as testimony, thus, apparently
narrowing the gap between the U.K. and other states in this area as well. See R.S.C., order 39,
rule 1, amended by S.1. 1051 (1984). 1 Supreme Court Practice at 602 (3d Cum. Supp. 1985).
[57] See especially U.S. Const. amend. IV prohibits not all searches, but only unreasonable
searches and seizures. Terms such as due process, excessive fines, unusual punishments, necessary
and proper laws, and general welfare are other examples of a style of drafting sometimes
disparaged in the age of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations, but not without merit. After
some hesitation, the concept of reasonableness has been adopted by the American Law Institute
as the dominant principle concerning jurisdiction with regard to foreign relations law. See
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) §§ 402-403, 421. 431 &
Introductory Note to pt. IV (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
[58] See, e.g., Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 Yale L.J. 515 (1953).
[59] The bridge metaphor has been common in discussion of the Convention. See, e.g., Letter
of Submittal from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon included in Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting to the Senate the Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Sen. Exec. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
reprinted in 12 IL.M. 323, 324 (1973).
[60] Earlier state cases, in large part, answered yes. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesel-
lschaft v. Superior Court (Volkswagen I), 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1973):
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court (Volkswagen II), 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238. 186
Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982). Later cases, particularly in the federal courts, were split, but tended to
sustain discovery orders to parties over whom the court had jurisdiction without prior resort to the
Convention. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co. GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633,
cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 2887; In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
[611 Or, as in several of the cases cited in the preceding notes, third party defendants in
product liability or industrial accident cases brought in by the primary defendant.
[62] For instance, in both Volkswagen 11, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, and Pierburg, 137 Cal. App.
3d 238, which were product liability cases arising out of automobile accidents, plaintiffs aban-
doned the discovery efforts and entered into settlements following the decisions for the Courts of
Appeal.
[631 For a strong argument that the Convention should always be resorted to first, see Radvan,
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Concerning Its Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1031 (1984).
[64] Section 437 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
arges screening for all discovery orders directed abroad, whether or not the state where the witness
or docuement are located is a party to the convention, See id. Comment a, Reporters" Note 2
(1986)
[65] Discovery through consults or commissions and without compulsion under Chapter II is
often practiced with respect to states, such as France, that have blocking statutes not applicable
"when international agreements provide otherwise." See, e.g., France: Law Relating to the
Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or
Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons, Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.O. 1799, reprinted in
75 Am. J. Int'l L. 382 (1981).
166] Judgment of Oct. 10, 1980, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 1981 Juristenzeitung 538 (Docu-
ment discovery denied); Judgment of Nov. 27, 1980, Munich, 1981 Juristenzeitung 540 (oral
examination of witnesses permitted). Both decisions as well as the Letter of Request are
reproduced in English at 20 I.L.M. 1025-56 (1981).
[67) The sequence is, of course, made up, but the substance, I think, is not-
[68] Coming Glass, Judgment of Oct. 31, 1980, Oherlandesgericht, Munich, was similar in
outline to Rauland, [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, discussed earlier. In both cases, plaintiff brought suit for
patent infringement, and was met with a defense and counterclaim based on allegations of
unlawful combinations with foreign parties, whose evidence was sought through international
judicial assistance. For a sequal to the decisions reported at supra note 66, see Judgment of June
9, 1981, Amtsgericht, Munich, and Judgment of June 10, 1980, Landgericht, Munich, Recht der
Internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW/AWD] at 850 (Dec. 1981), upholding refusal by the witness, an
officer of Siemens, to give testimony on questions such as "with whom other than with plaintiff
did your company conduct negotiations concerning a joint venture agreement?"
[69] See Declaration of United Kingdom, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden pursuant to Article 23, reproduced in 28 U.S.C.A. following § 1781 (Supp.
1986).
[70] In Corning Glass, Judgment of Oct. 31, 1980, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, the Letter of
Request, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 1044-46, asked for three agreements specified with dates and
parties, which would presumably have passed muster under the English declaration if separated
from other parts of the request, plus "all drafts, revisions or amendments thereof," which would
have probably been rejected. It also asked, inter alia, for "documents, whether described as
minutes, or notes or otherwise" forming a record of 34 meetings, described by dates and parties
represented, as well as of 21 telephone conversations. Id. at 1045. Evidently, the occurrence of
these meetings had been learned by ITT, the proponent, in discovery in the U.S., but it probably
could not be certain, in Lord Fraser's terms, that a record existed of each meeting. One may doubt
whether such a request would survive scrutiny by the English courts. Of course, in the actual case
the issue did not arise, since the documentary request was rejected in toto.
[711 It is well known that the effect of Article 23 and the declarations thereunder threaten the
usefulness of the Convention. See Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention
of Mar. 18, 1970, Report on Second Meeting (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1675-77, 1678-79
(1985). Thus far, however, the only suggested remedy has been to move toward the English version
of declaration under Article 23, as discussed at supra note 68.
[72] Cf. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) Introductory
Note to pt. IV, ch 7, subchapter A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
[73) I repeat that the discussion here concerns only civil litigation; administrative proceedings,
grand jury investigations, and criminal proceedings raise considerations - cutting both ways -
that go well beyond this brief essay.
[74] Convention, supra note 48, at 2562.
[75] One recent case comes to mind in the latter category, but there the court in state A (the
U.K.) rejected the application for a Letter of Request, because it thought the desired information
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improperly sought to explore the motives for a foreign government decree relied on by defendant
as a basis for not making good on a guarantee. Settebello Ltd. v. Banco Totta & Acores, [19851 2
All E R. 1025 (C.A.).
[761 I have elsewhere expressed my negative views about the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act. Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A Reply to A. V. Lowe, 75
Am. J. Int'l L. 629 (1981). It is important to note, however, that that act and similar blocking
legislation in other states, was a response to U.S. government investigations in connection with
shipping conferences, the uranium cartel, and the like. See supra note 30. One may believe that
defensive measures by sovereigns against other sovereigns are justified, but still agree with the
statement in the text concerning civil litigation of interest neither to State A nor State B.
(77] Convention, supra note 48, at 2561.
[781 Code of Civil Procedure § 280, reprinted in Doing Business in Japan, app. 6A, 65-66 (Z.
Kitagawa ed. 1986) (English version). This example is cited in Oxman. The Choice benveen Direct
Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 733, 768 (1983).
[791 ZPO § 384; see supra note 68.
[801 See e.g., The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
[81] See e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
[821 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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